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• A social vaccine is introduced in order to let the punishment system work even in the second-order social dilemmas.
• We show that the coercive introduction of a small number of non-cooperators, i.e., a social vaccine, essentially resolves the dilemmas.
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a b s t r a c t
Although there is much support for the punishment system as a sophisticated approach
to resolving social dilemmas, more than a few researchers have also pointed out the
limitations of such an approach. Second-order free riding is a serious issue facing the
punishment system. Various pioneering works have suggested that an anti-social behavior
or noise stemming from amutationmay, surprisingly, be helpful for avoiding second-order
freeloaders. In this work, we show through mathematical analysis and an agent-based
simulation of a model extending the meta-norms game that the coercive introduction
of a small number of non-cooperators can maintain a cooperative regime robustly. This
paradoxical idea was inspired by the effect of a vaccine, which is a weakened pathogen
injected into a human body to create antibodies and ward off infection by that pathogen.
Our expectation is that the coercive introduction of a few defectors, i.e., a social vaccine,
will help maintain a highly cooperative regime because it will ensure that the punishment
system works.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The cooperative behaviors among people as they relate to social dilemmas remain extremely important issues in the
modern world. Many theoretical studies have attempted to address social dilemmas by analyzing, among others, direct [1]
and indirect reciprocity [2], assigning tags [3], reputations [4], spatial structures [5], networks [6,7], and incentives [8]. This
latter idea, namely, external incentives given to players to promote cooperative behaviors, has been the subject of extensive
interest and analysis by scholars.
Punishment, an external incentive discussed by Brandt et al. [9], is a powerful resolution for social dilemmas. Although
some studies [10–13] have shown that a costly punishment can effectively guarantee cooperation, others [14–18] have
shown just the opposite. Boyd et al. [19] also pointed out that the average payoff of a group significantly decreases
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if punishment has been involved. Furthermore, Helbing et al. [20] showed that excessive punishment does not result
in cooperative regimes. Some research [21–23] has analyzed the punishment system as it pertains to proactive central
institutions, not reactive individual surveillance, and found that the stability of the punishment system comes at the cost of
sacrificed efficiency.
Overcoming the limitations of the punishment system remains a topic of interest. Perc and Szolnoki [24] tested their
idea of adaptive punishment to avoid a challenge that the perfect cooperators invade the punishers. They also dealt with
adaptive reward in a separate study [25]. Conditional and correlated punishment and reward have also been shown to
influence the effectiveness of punishment [26,27]. Chen et al. [28] proposed probabilistic punishment to prevent hyper-cost
of punishments, while Rand and Nowak [29] proposed antisocial punishment that punishes cooperators to maintain the
predominance of a loner over a cooperator.
One of the most pressing challenges currently facing the punishment system is the second-order social dilemmas
problem. If a cooperative regime is perfectly achieved, no punishment is needed, and thus, perfect cooperators can invade
the population as a neutral drift. Such perfect cooperators are second-order freeloaders because they shirk watching and
punishing the other players’ actions and their payoffs are higher than those of cooperative punishers. These freeloaders
degenerate the function of the punishment, and thus, the cooperative regime becomes fragile.
In a pioneering work, Lotem et al. [30] demonstrated that antisocial behaviors paradoxically can help resolve second-
order dilemmas. They mathematically analyzed phenotypic defectors that always defect in a one-to-one game using image
scoring and indirect reciprocity. Sherratt andRoberts [31] applied Lotemet al.’smodel to direct reciprocity. This idea, i.e., that
anti-social agents can affect the evolution of cooperation, has been repeatedly investigated. For example, Hauert et al. [32]
introduced a loner agent who does not participate in a public good game, and Arenas et al. [33] tested a joker agent that
only performs destructive actions.
Some researchers have applied Lotem et al.’s [30] paradoxical idea to the punishment system. Hauser et al. [34] pointed
out that mutations maintain a steady supply of agents that punish freeloaders, and Helbing et al. [35] demonstrated that
mutations continue to bear defectors in a regime, and thus, a cooperative colony where players are fixed to a lattice
and communicate with the von Neumann neighborhood can be maintained on a bidirectional graph. Their results were
consistent with those of Cohen et al.’s shadow of the adaptive future [36]. Traulsen et al. [37] showed that a high mutation
rate leads to the prevalence of cooperators irrespective of whether individuals have the option to abstain from the public
enterprise.
The studies discussed above indicate that introducing noise to a population maintains cooperation. In this paper, we
extend and definitize this idea, arguing that coercively introducing a few specific non-cooperative behaviors, i.e., applying a
social vaccine, can robustlymaintain a cooperative regime. Generally speaking, a vaccine is theweakened formof a pathogen
that is used for inoculation to create antibodies andprevent infection by this pathogen. A social vaccine refers to the existence
of a small number of agents in a population that always defect to the other agents, with the effect that the norms of the
population can be maintained at a high level.
We need to analyze whether cooperative non-punishers or second-order freeloaders can be excluded by the social
vaccines in order to determine if social vaccines are an effective means of maintaining cooperative regimes. To this end,
we adopted the meta-norms game proposed by Axelrod [38] to facilitate a comparison of the effects of punishment and
defection. Generally, a player who contributes in the game but never defrays the cost for punishing is more evolutionarily
adaptive than one who contributes in the game and does pay the cost for punishing. This means that eventually no one
defrays the cost of maintaining the punishment system.
The meta-norms game [38] is a well-known model for studying the maintenance of norms in a population. As an
extension of the public good game, this game provides an excellent model for studying how norms are maintained in
a population without centralized authority. Heckathorn [39] and Horne and Cutlip [40] experimentally supported the
meta-norms that people have. Hilbe et al. [41] experimentally showed the rationality of a second-order punishment in
an authorized sanction system and provided mathematical analysis showing that cooperation cannot be maintained in the
norms game but can be with the introduction of meta-norms. In this study, we examine the effect of defectors in a meta-
norm game in which all agents have to participate in the game, n-to-n interaction is required, and the installed cost for
punishment is explicit.
2. Mathematical analysis of the model
In this section, we devise and mathematically analyze the models of a norms game, a meta-norms game, and a meta-
norms game with coercive introduction of social vaccines.
The norms game can be viewed as an extension of the public good game. Consider a population that consists of N agents.
Agent i can choose between two alternatives of action: defect and cooperate. The probability of defect is represented by bi
(boldness). If agent i chooses to defect, it can get a payoff of T . The other (N − 1) agents get a payoff of H . If i cooperates, all
the agents get a payoff of 0.
So far, this corresponds to the public good game, but in the norms game, there is an opportunity of agent i being punished
by the other (N − 1) agents, which is represented as j. Agent j discovers agent i’s defection with a probability of s following
a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. If the defection is not discovered, nothing happens and the payoffs of i and j are
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Fig. 1. An extensive form of norms game andmeta-norms game (fromAxelrod [38]). In the norms game, agents have opportunities for punishing defectors
among all agents except self (N − 1). In the meta-norms game, if an agent does not punish a defector in the norms game in spite of one’s detection of
the defector’s non-contribution in the public good game, the other players have an opportunity to punish this agent if they succeed in detecting its non-
punishing action.
unchanged. If j discovers i’s defection, j punishes iwith a probability that is equal to j’s vengefulness vj. If j punishes i, i gets
a payoff of P and j gets a payoff of E. If j does not punish i, the payoffs of i and j are unchanged.
So far, this corresponds to the norms game. Themeta-norms game introduces a structurewhereby agent j can bepunished
by another (N − 2) agent, represented as k, if agent k discovers that agent j has discovered agent i’s defection but has not
punished agent i for it with the probability of s, the same as defined above. If k chooses to punish j, j gets a payoff ofMP and
k gets a payoff ofME. These structures are summarized in Fig. 1.
2.1. Analysis of the norms and meta-norms games
In this section, wemathematically analyze the norms andmeta-norms games to showwhat sort of behavior is exhibited
in the two. For simplicity, we analyze the basic mechanisms of the model by calculating a case with one mutant invading
when all the other agents have the same strategies.
Here, agent i’s boldness (probability of defection) and vengefulness (probability of punishment) are given by bi and vi,
respectively. The expected payoff of agent i can then be expressed by Eq. (1). The first term is the payoff obtained due to
agent i’s own defection, the second term is the cost incurred by the defection of other agents, the third term is the cost of
punishing other agents, and the fourth term is the cost of punishment for the agent’s own defection.
The third term vi2
n
j=1
j≠i
b2j can be derived from probability of defection bj, probability of the defection being discovered
bj/2, and probability of punishment vi. In the norms game and meta-norms game, the probability of being discovered by
someone else s refers to the s in the condition s < bi for the defection of a first-level agent in the game. Accordingly,
at the point in time where agent j may or may not be discovered by i, 0 ≤ s < bj holds. The probability of being
discovered is therefore bj/2, which leads to the third term. The fourth and later terms can be derived in a similar
manner.
So far, this corresponds to the norms game, while the fifth and sixth terms correspond to the payoffs of the meta-norms
game. The fifth term is the cost of agent i punishing other agents for not punishing a defection and the sixth term is the cost
of the punishment received by agent i for not punishing the defection of another agent.
The fifth term ME vi4
n
k=1
k≠i
n
j=1
j≠i,k
b3k(1 − vj) is derived from the probability of k defecting bk, the probability of that
being discovered bk/2, the probability of j not being punished 1 − vj, the probability of i discovering punishment bk/2,
and the probability of i performing punishment vi. As in the third term, the probability of the defection being discovered
is bk/2.
Ui = T · bi + H ·
n
j=1
j≠i
bj + E vi2
n
j=1
j≠i
b2j + P
b2i
2
n
j=1
j≠i
vj +ME vi4
n
k=1
k≠i
n
j=1
j≠i,k
b3k(1− vj)
+MP 1− vi
4
n
k=1
k≠i
n
j=1
j≠i,k
b3kvj. (1)
We investigate the dynamics and stable points of the population’s strategy by using partial differentials proposed by
Galan [42]. In order to establish an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we first need to demonstrate that the ESS is robust
against any mutant. When a population’s strategies are all the same and it is not possible for an arbitrary mutant to enter
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Fig. 2. Expected dynamics in the norms game. The x axis shows boldness and the y axis shows vengefulness. Colors correspond to evolution pressure:
the redder the color, the higher the pressure. Arrows represent the expected dynamics of the system. There is a downward trend in the vengefulness of
the population. The population strategy consists of a decrease in boldness with cooperation becoming dominant (region (1)) followed by an increase in
boldness with defection eventually becoming dominant (region (2)). The green circle denotes the only stable point in the system. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
the population, Eq. (2) holds. Here, the strategies of a certain mutant agent are assumed to be bm and vm.
∂Um
∂bm
= ∂Ui
∂bm
OR

bm = 1 AND ∂Um
∂bm
≥ ∂Ui
∂bm

OR

bm = 0 AND ∂Um
∂bm
≤ ∂Ui
∂bm

.
(2)
If ∂Ui/∂bm < ∂Um/∂bm is satisfied, the incremental value of the expected payoff of themutant, whose bm is slightly larger
than bi, is greater than that of the majority, and thus such a mutant can invade the population. As a result, the component
of B in a dynamic vector at this position points in a positive direction. In contrast, if the direction of the inequality sign is
inverse, the dynamic vector at this position points in a negative direction. As in Eq. (2), it is also possible to express ESS
conditions and see the direction of the dynamics with regard to the value of V by using Eq. (3):
∂Um
∂vm
= ∂Ui
∂vm
OR

vm = 1 AND ∂Um
∂vm
≥ ∂Ui
∂vm

OR

vm = 0 AND ∂Um
∂vm
≤ ∂Ui
∂vm

.
(3)
By expressing the direction of the dynamics in this way at each point, we can obtain a description of the dynamics of a
strategy in the population, albeit under the assumption that all members of the population have the same uniform strategy.
In this paper, we use the same payoff parameters as in the simulations of Ref. [38], i.e., T = 3,H = −1, E = ME = −2,
and P = MP = −9. With regard to the population size, we obtained our results using N = 20. Fig. 2 shows the dynamics
in the norms game. The state initially trends towards (B, V ) = (0, 0) but ultimately defection becomes dominant and the
state converges on (B, V ) = (1, 0). (See Appendix A to derive the curve in this figure.) Figs. 2 and 3 show the same results
as Galan [42].
Fig. 3 and Appendix B show the dynamics in themeta-norms game. This game converges on an equilibrium point close to
(B, V ) = (0, 1), but this equilibrium point is unstable. If the state moves into a region where V decreases due to a mutation
or other perturbation, it will finally converge on (B, V ) = (1, 0).
2.2. Introducing a social vaccine
In the meta-norms game, although there is an equilibrium point in the region where cooperation is dominant, it has
been shown that this is an unstable equilibrium point and that a stable equilibrium is attained at an equilibrium point
(B, V ) = (1, 0)where defection is dominant.
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Fig. 3. Expected dynamics in themeta-norms game. The x axis shows boldness and the y axis shows vengefulness. Colors correspond to evolution pressure:
the redder the color, the higher the pressure. Arrows in the diagram represent the expected dynamics of the system. Two stable points exist. If the initial
state is (B, V ) = (0.5, 0.5), the system converges to the stable point in the upper left corner, as shown by arrow (1). However, this stable point is vulnerable
to perturbations, which can cause a downward trend in vengefulness as shown by arrow (2). As a result, the system eventually converges to the stable
point (green circle) in the lower right corner. This stable point corresponds to (B, V ) = (1, 0), at which defection is dominant. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 4. Expected dynamics in the meta-norms game where a social vaccine is introduced. The x axis shows boldness and the y axis shows vengefulness.
Colors correspond to evolution pressure: the redder the color, the higher the pressure. As in Fig. 3, the system converges to the stable point in the upper
left corner, as shown by arrow (1), but what is conclusively different from Fig. 3 is that vengefulness increases in the region denoted by (2). The boundary
curve that determines the orientation of the vertical axis (V ) is shown as a curve (a). As a result, cooperation and punishment are robustly maintained with
no downward trend in vengefulness. Although a stable point at which defection is dominant exists, the system will converge to that point only when the
initial value of vengefulness is very small. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
We introduce into the population a social vaccine, that is, a small number of agents that always act non-cooperatively, in
order tomaintain cooperation robustly. Here, the coercive introduction of one agent in a population always adopts a strategy
of (B, V ) = (1, 0).
Fig. 4 and Appendix C show the dynamics obtained for a population when a social vaccine is introduced in the same way
as in Figs. 2 and 3. As these figures show, in the case of coercive introduction of one agent as a social vaccine, the boundary
line that determines the orientation of the vertical axis (V ) dynamics remains unchanged at close to V = 0.2, and in most
regions, the dynamics are drawn with an upward orientation. This means that there is no drop in the vengefulness of the
population. It can thus be seen that a state where defection is always punished is maintained, and cooperation is robustly
maintained.
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Fig. 5. The time series of average values of boldness in the meta-norms game without the social vaccines. This graph plots the case of (E, T ) = (−2, 3)
in blue, (−4, 3) in red, (−4, 6) in purple, and (−2, 6) in green. Note that the cooperation regimes collapse in all situations regardless of the differences of
their processes. The lower the temptation for non-cooperation, the slower the speed of collapse. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
3. Verification by agent-based simulation
We simulate an agent-based model of the meta-norms games to demonstrate the effect of the social vaccine on the
evolution of cooperation.
3.1. Simulation overview
The number of agents of the model is fixed to N and each independently has a strategy, (bi, vi), where the probability of
defection and the probability of punishment. In a simulation, each period has two steps in a generation: playing the game
and adapting the agent strategies.
Step 1. Playing the meta-norms game
Each agent plays the following process four times. First, an agent i chooses whether to cooperate or defect in accordance
with bi. Next, agent i chooses the other agent j randomly. If j is a defector, nature provides j’s non-cooperative action to iwith
the probability of s in accordance with a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. If i recognizes j’s defect, i decides whether
or not to punish j in accordance with vi. Moreover, if j does not punish the other agent despite j’s detection (because j also
has an opportunity to punish another agent’s defects), themeta-norm of iworks. If so, the nature provides j’s non-punishing
action to iwith the same probability of s and i decides whether to meta-punish j or not in accordance with vi.
Step 2. Adapting agent strategies
Each agent evolves its strategy by using a roulette selection of genetic algorithm (GA). The agent randomly selects two
agents among the others to become its parents, including itself. The roulette selection sets a probability distribution of all
agents asΠi = (Ui − Umin)2/j(Uj − Umin)2, where Ui means agent i’s expected payoff and Umin means a minimum value
of the expected payoffs among all. Finally, each agent updates its strategy using a uniform crossover technique with a 1%
mutation rate to maintain the diversity of the strategy space.
3.2. Effect of parameter values
In order to verify the effect of the social vaccine, we tested the robustness of cooperation while changing the parameter
values: specifically, the costs of punishment, P and MP , and the incentive powers for defect, T and E. We categorized
the parameters into three groups. The fixed parameters are initially given and never change through the simulation. The
operational parameters are initially given and never change through a run while the initial value is changeable in a run, and
thus, those are targets for verifying the effect on the outputs of the values. The variations always change the values through a
run. The fixed parameters consist of the population size (N = 20), the cost of hurting (H = −1), the costs of the punishment
(P = MP = −9), the number of generations (= 104), and the mutation rate (= 0.01). The operational parameters are the
cost of temptation (1 ≤ T ≤ 6) and the cost of enforcement (−6 ≤ E = ME ≤ −1). The variations are the boldness (bi)
and the vengefulness (vi) initialized as uniform distribution of [0, 1].
As clearly shown in Fig. 5, the average value of agents probabilities of boldness is robust for the changes of the values of
the operational parameters E and T . Why are not the final situations the cooperative regimes? Because once the cooperative
regime emerges and the defectors are almost extinct, agents with low vengefulness may penetrate the group as mutants
with high vengefulness because they are indistinguishable from the others. If a certain number of defectors now invade as
vengefulness decreases in this way, agents who did not punish those defectors are punished by themselves through meta-
norms, and thus, the norm to cooperate is again established. However, if only a few defectors are invaded during such a
drop in vengefulness, vengefulness continues to drop even lower. Now, if defectors are invaded at that time, the cooperative
situation suddenly collapses. In short, the long generation provides many chances for a collapse of cooperation. When the
temptation to defect is high and the cost of the punishment is low, there is a strong incentive for defection to penetrate once
cooperation has been achieved. Consequently, defectors will penetrate up to the time of dropping the vengefulness.
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Fig. 6. Average values of boldness at the final generation with various values of E and T without the social vaccines. The cooperation collapses regardless
of the value of T and, in regard to E, that cooperation collapses for any cost of punishment other than when it drops under 2. In that situation, the cost of
punishment for defect is smaller than the temptation to defect, and thus the punishment can be easily maintained.
Fig. 7. The time series of the average values of the boldness in the meta-norms game with coercively introduced social vaccine. This graph plots the case
of (E, T ) = (−2, 3) in blue, (−4, 3) in red, (−4, 6) in purple, and (−2, 6) in green. All cases show the stability of maintaining the cooperative regimes.
(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 8. Average values of boldness at final generation with various values of E and T with coercive introduction of social vaccine. Compared to outcomes
without social vaccine (Fig. 6), the cooperative regime is robustly maintained over a wide range of E and T .
While the meta-norms are vulnerable when the cost of the punishment is less than about −2, as indicated in Fig. 6, a
social vaccine can change the situation dramatically, as shown in Fig. 7. When the social vaccine is introduced in the game,
the cooperative regime emerges very robustly regardless of the values of the operational parameters. This situation occurs
because the presence of the vaccine agent keeps up the punishing functions of the agents. Consequently, agents with low
vengefulness can be easily discovered, thereby preventing a drop in the group’s overall level of vengefulness. As summarized
in Fig. 8, introducing the social vaccine is effective in a broad parameter space. However, the average defection ratio increases
when the absolute value of E is large. As Fig. 9 shows, the basin of the cooperative regimes narrows in accordance with the
increase of the absolute value of E.
3.3. Effect of population size
In the discussion so far, we have determined the dynamics with a population size fixed to 20. Here, we check the
robustness of the population size on the cooperation in the meta-norms game. All fixed parameters except for the number
of agents (N) and the number of generations are the same as before. T (= 3) and E(= ME = −2) are added to the fixed
parameters in this simulation. The operational parameters are population size (= 20; 40; 60; 80; 100) and the number of
generations (= 102; 103; 104; 105). The variations are the same as before.
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Fig. 10. Average values of boldness at final generation with various values of N and numbers of generation without the social vaccine (upper panel) and
with the coercive introduction of the social vaccine (lower panel). In the upper panel, the increase of the population size results in cooperation. Cooperation
collapses when the population size is less than 40. In the lower panel, cooperative regimes are achieved regardless of the N and the number of generations.
As shown in the upper panel of Fig. 10, the increase of the population size yields cooperative regimes without the social
vaccines. This is trivial because the mutual surveillance power among agents strengthens while such a situation seems to
be unrealistic. The social vaccine, as shown in the lower panel contributes to the robustness of the cooperation.
4. Concluding remarks
We have demonstrated that cooperation can be robustly maintained by introducing social vaccines, a small number of
perfect defectors, into a group, even under conditions where meta-norms would otherwise break down. The social vaccine
essentially resolves the second-order social dilemmas. Although the loner effect proposed by Hauert et al. [32], the joker
effect analyzed by Arenas et al. [33], and our social vaccine effect share the paradoxical idea of the evolution of cooperation
by introducing anti-social third players, there are two significant differences. First, all of the agents in our model coercively
participate in the game, while the loners and the jokers do not. Second, and more importantly, their orbits of dynamics
describe limit cycles, and thus, the average payoffs are closely fixed to a low level. In contrast, the social vaccine establishes
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and maintains a cooperative regime, and thus, the average payoffs of players are equal to those of perfect cooperative
regimes.
We must also mention how our approach differs from Lotem et al.’s indirect model [30] and Sherratt et al.’s direct
model [31]. They modeled one-to-one interactions as a donation game in which the discriminators bore punishment costs
indirectly or directly, while wemodeled n-to-n interactions in themeta-norms game and installed the cost for punishments
explicitly. Moreover, the players of their models require an information sharing system that records and shares the history
of the behaviors of all players because they adopted the tag model. In contrast, in our model, players need no such system.
One criticism to our approach may be who defrays the cost of the social vaccines. The present version seems not to
answer this point, as the social vaccines are exogenously given in the model. However, the social vaccines let the players be
cooperative, and therefore, they receive higher payoffs than they would without the social vaccines. This difference in price
is rationally useful for an underlying asset for keeping the social vaccines. Therefore, the system with the social vaccines
would be feasible if a centralized institution could place tax on the players to put the social vaccines in the regime.
In terms of future work, we need to test variations of the social vaccines. In the present work, we define them as
non-cooperative non-punishers, but would cooperative punishers or non-cooperative punishers also be suitable as social
vaccines? Exploring the game types in which the social vaccines have an effect is challenging. Okada et al. [8] theoretically
categorized themeta-incentives game, including themeta-norms game.We did not analyze the spatial structures, although
many other studies [9,24,20,5,22,23,27] have simulated the effects of the punishments in spatial public good games,
including the lattice structure. We intend to address this point in our future work.
Appendix A. Derivation of the border conditions for ESS in the norms game
The curves in Figs. 2–4 that show the borders for ESS are calculated as follows. First, we analyze (B, V ), the strategy of
each agent in a group of N agents. Assume that one mutant agent with a strategy (bm, vm) invades a group of N − 1 agents
with the same strategy (bi, vi). Let Ui be an expected utility of an agent with (bi, vi) and Um be that of an agent with (bm, vm).
Ui and Um are calculated using the first to fourth terms of Eq. (1).
Ui = T · bi + H(N − 2)bi + H · bm + E vi2 (N − 2)b
2
i + E
vi
2
b2m + P
b2i
2
(N − 2)vi + P b
2
i
2
vm
Um = T · bm + H(N − 1)bi + E vm2 (N − 1)b
2
i + P
b2m
2
(N − 1)vi.
We can substitute (T = 3,H = −1, E = ME = −2, P = MP = −9,N = 20) into these equations to calculate the
border condition for ESS on the B-axis. When ∂Um
∂bm
>
∂Ui
∂bm
, the horizontal component is positive and vice versa. Further, the
border condition on the V -axis can be calculated by analyzing ∂Um
∂vm
= ∂Ui
∂vm
.
Appendix B. Derivation of the border conditions for ESS in the meta-norms game
Using Eq. (1), Ui and Um are calculated as follows.
Ui = T · bi + H(N − 2)bi + H · bm + E · vi2 · (N − 2)b
2
i + E ·
vi
2
· b2m + P ·
b2i
2
· (N − 2)vi + P · b
2
i
2
· vm
+ME · vi
4
[(N − 2)b3i {(N − 3)(1− vi)+ (1− vm)} + (N − 2)b3m(1− vi)]
+MP (1− vi)
4
[(N − 2)b3i {(N − 3)vi + vm} + (N − 2)b3mvi]
Um = T · bm + H(N − 1)bi + E · vm2 · (N − 1)b
2
i + P ·
b2m
2
· (N − 1)vi
+ME · vm
4
· (N − 1)(N − 2)b3i (1− vi)+MP
(1− vm)
4
· (N − 1)(N − 2)b3i vi.
The border conditions for ESS in the meta-norms game can be calculated in the same manner as the norms game.
Appendix C. Derivation of the border conditions for ESS in the meta-norms game with social vaccine
Assume that one social vaccine agent with a strategy (bs, vs) invades a group of N − 1 agents with the same strategy
(bi, vi).
Let (B, V ) = (bs, vs) be the strategy of a social vaccine agent. The group includes N − 2 agents with the same strategy
(bi, vi), one mutant agent with (bm, vm), and one social vaccine agent with (bs, vs).
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You can calculate Ui and Um as follows.
Ui = T · bi + H{(N − 3)bi + bm + bs} + E · vi2 {(N − 3)b
2
i + b2m + b2s } + P ·
b2i
2
{(N − 3)vi + vm + vs}
+ME · vi
4
[(N − 3){(N − 4)b3i (1− vi)+ b3i (1− vm)+ b3i (1− vs)} + (N − 3)b3m(1− vi)+ b3m(1− vs)
+ (N − 3)b3s (1− vi)+ b3s (1− vm)] +MP ·
(1− vi)
4
[(N − 3){(N − 4)b3i vi + b3i vm + b3i vs}
+ (N − 3)b3mvi + b3mvs + (N − 3)b3s v+b3s vm]
Um = T · bi + H{(N − 2)bi + bs} + E · vm2 {(N − 2)b
2
i + b2s } + P ·
b2m
2
{(N − 2)vi + vs}
+ME · vm
4
[(N − 2){(N − 3)b3i (1− vi)+ b3i (1− vs)} + (N − 2)b3s (1− vi)]
+MP · (1− vm)
4
[(N − 2){(N − 3)b3i vi + b3i vs} + (N − 2)b3s vi].
The border conditions for ESS in the meta-norms game with the social vaccine can be calculated in the same manner as
the norms game.
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